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Introduction
1 In the winter of 1895-1896, the British zoologist and comparative psychologist C. Lloyd
Morgan delivered some lectures in Boston, New York and Chicago. While in Boston
delivering the Lowell Lectures, published the very same year with the title Habit and
Instinct (Morgan 1896), he stayed for a week in the house of William James, to whose
theory of emotion he dedicated part of his lectures. In the preface of the volume he also
mentions the evolutionary biologist Charles O. Whitman, at the time head professor of
the new-born Department of Biology at the University of Chicago, with whom Morgan
spent  some  time  during  his  stay,  working  on  experiments  on  instinct  theory  with
pigeons.1
2 We can suppose that when Morgan was in Chicago he also met George Herbert Mead.2
Mead arrived at the University of Chicago in 1894, at the time when he was trying to
explain  emotion and the  organic  evolution  of  habit,  attention  and mind within  an
experimentalist  physiological  perspective.  In  particular,  Mead  was  focusing  on
physiological psychology and psychophysics as well as on comparative psychology, of
which Morgan, as disciple of George J. Romanes, was one of the main proponents. It is
therefore highly possible that Mead attended Morgan’s lecture on “Instinct and Habit”
at the University of Chicago, and we can also conjecture that they had the chance to
discuss their common interests: they were both deeply concerned with physiological
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psychology and the evolutionary processes in behaviour. In support of our conjecture is
the fact that Mead wrote a critical review of Morgan’s An Introduction to Comparative
Psychology, published the following year (Mead 1895b). What is even more interesting,
however,  is  the  fact  that  early  in  the  twentieth  century  both  Morgan  and  Mead
elaborated their own theories of  emergence and emergent evolution in which their
respective  research  interests  found a  philosophical  synthesis.  The  Gifford  Lectures,
published  with  the  title  of  Emergent  Evolution (Morgan  1927)  are  in  fact  Morgan’s
philosophical  explanation of  the evolution process  and his  philosophical  testament,
whereas the Carus Lectures, published posthumously with the title The Philosophy of the
Present (1932)  represent  Mead’s  last  attempt  to  elaborate  a  theory  of  emergence
through which to interpret the theory of the evolution of mind and language he had
developed over the years. 
3 In what follows we will try to detect the most significant turning points on the parallel
intellectual  paths  that  led  Lloyd Morgan and Mead to  develop independently  their
theories of emergence, taking as a starting point the lectures given by Morgan in the
United States. Both theories of emergence are in conditioned the reflections that the
two thinkers had developed over the years and which have their roots in the early
1890s. 
4 The  article  will  be  developed  as  follows.  I  briefly  describe  Morgan’s  conception  of
organic and mental evolution as elaborated in the 1890s and summarised in his Lowell
Lectures. I introduce, then, Mead’s early writings on psychophysics and comparative
psychology, pointing out a similarity between Mead and Morgan’s ideas on organic and
mental evolution at that time. Then I examine their theories of emergence from the
1920s, pointing out more interesting similarities and dissimilarities.
5 The  aim  of  the  article  is  to  make  a  contribution  to  the  contemporary  debate  on
emergence  by  focusing  on  two authors  that  first  elaborated  a  theory  that  tried  to
synthesize  the  biological,  the  psycho-physiological  and  the  social  dimensions  of
emergent  processes.  The  debate  about  the  concept  of  “emergence”  is  in  fact
particularly varied (see Kim 1999, 2005, 2006a,b; Cunningham 2001; Pihlström 2002; El-
Hani 2002; El-Hani & Pihlström 2002; Chalmers 2006; Bedau & Humphreys 2008; Okasha
2012; Humphreys 2016; Sartenaer 2016; Lota 2017; Tononi & Koch 2015; Hodgson 2000;
Sawyer 2001;  Lawson 2013).3 Shedding light  on the conceptions of  two of  the main
figures in the history of the theories of emergence would contribute to a more richly-
articulated  and  complete  historical-theoretical  understanding  of  a  debate  which  is
being currently renewed.
 
Lloyd Morgan between Ontological Monism and
Epistemological Dualism
6 Morgan presented the Lowell Lectures at Boston, New York and Chicago, and published
them  with  the  title  Habit  and  Instinct (Morgan  1896).  He  was  at  that  time  deeply
committed to evolution theory and James’  functionalism.4 More specifically,  he was
studying the relationship between the hereditary aspects related to the genes5 and the
role behaviour plays in the variation of those aspects, developing his observation of
behavioural traits of different types of animals that prefigured those in more complex
organisms. It is from these observations and interests that he wrote An Introduction to
Comparative Psychology (1903 [1894a]), which soon became the manifesto of the modern
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comparative psychology and behaviourist  movement.  An Introduction represented in
fact a shift  away of Morgan’s attitude towards comparative psychology from a first
critical acceptance of Romanes’ approach based on a systematization of the available
anecdotal  evidence  towards  a  thorough-going  experimental  approach (Costall  1998;
Boakes 1984).  We find here formulated what was later known as “Morgan’s canon,”
which became a central and founding principle that has profoundly determined the
history of comparative psychology, illustrating the overcoming of the pre-scientific and
anthropomorphic  dimensions of  zoopsychology as  it  had been presented by George
John Romanes.6
7 Following this new approach, in his Lowell  Lectures Morgan presented some of the
results of his studies and observations on animal behaviour and described the relation
of  organic  and  mental  evolution  as  based  on  the  interaction  between  congenital
instincts and inherited habits, from an evolutionary perspective. His main thesis was
that organic evolution occurred in the working together of plastic modification and
germinal  variation,  and  therefore  habits  and  instincts  were  the  expression  of
respectively individual modification and congenital variations of germinal origin. At
the basis of this thesis was the hypothesis that ontogenetic evolution of complex neural
states begins with simpler energy states in the germ-plasm, concluding that advanced
states of consciousness evolved from infra-conscious states corresponding to energy
transformations in the germ-plasm (Morgan 1903: 329), and that infra-consciousness,
which always accompanies brain action, is associated with all forms of energy.7
8 Building  upon  this  hypothesis,  in  Habit  and  Instinct  he  contended  that instinctive
activities are characterized by a certain amount of definiteness which is hereditary and
“not acquired in the course of individual experience.” Whereas, habits are the result of
individual  acquisition,  and  are  “stereotyped  by  repetition  in  the  course  of  the
experience of the organism” (Morgan 1896: 16-7). Modifications as such, therefore, are
not inherited but are the condition under which “congenital variations are favoured
and given time to get a hold on the organism, and are thus enabled by degrees to reach
the fully adaptive level” (ibid.: 321).8
9 In this frame, where does consciousness fit? Morgan, who in An Introduction referred to
William  James  (borrowing  from  his  conception  of  consciousness),  argued  that  the
emergence of consciousness is part of the first instinctive response of an individual
organism  to  a  sensible  stimulus  which  provides  the  initial  experience  by  which
subsequent conscious guidance of behaviour is controlled. The co-ordination involved
on the occasion of the first performance is automatic, or instinctive, and cannot be
regarded as under the guidance of consciousness.  However,  the carrying out of  the
activity  furnishes  data  to  consciousness  in  the  light  of  which  “the  subsequent
performance of a like activity may be perfected, or modified, or checked.” (Morgan
1896: 6). The “initial bit of conscious experience” (ibid.: 135) therefore emerges with the
primary  experience-data,  already  grouped  according  to  the  nature  of  the  organic
response, and it is related to a “blind” impulse, that is, an internal state which prompt
us to perform certain actions (ibid.: 138). 
10 However, Morgan was ambiguous on what an “impulse” is, defining it as a “state of
consciousness” regarded as the result of physiological conditions with certain organic
accompaniments. The ambiguity is related to the fact that, on the one hand, Morgan
identified impulse with a state of consciousness; on the other hand, he specified that
the presence of a conscious impulse in the case of an instinctive activity is hypothetical
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but that one may legitimately infer from observed facts that “the organism under the
influence of a stimulus or complex group of stimuli is thrown into a state of unstable
equilibrium, and that stability is reached through the appropriate response” (ibid.: 140).
It seems, in other words, that on the ontological level he assumed the core thesis of the
functionalist  psychology,  according  to  which  psychic  phenomena  are  not  separate
elements, but maintaining it together with an epistemological more classic parallelist
perspective on consciousness.9 This idea followed from Morgan’s epistemological view
as deeply rooted in an evolving ontological monism which he was developing during
those years.10 His  rejection of  Cartesian ontological  dualism in favour of  a  monism,
according  to  which  brain  and  mind  are  the  same  stuff,11 went  together  with  his
epistemological dualism, according to which mind and matter were both “constructs,”
or  outcomes  of  different  analyses  of  experience:  that  of  the  psychologists  –  the
conscious  experience,  that  is  the  “metakinetic”  manifestations  –,  and  of  the
physiologists – the “kinetic” manifestations.12 In other words, Morgan was seeking to
join together an epistemological associationist perspective with an ontological monism.
However, despite his conviction that physiological common descent was something like
an  a  priori truth,  Morgan  could  not  dismiss  so  easily  the  problem  raised  by  the
qualitative gaps between organisms. 
 
Mead on Energy and Comparative Psychology. Some
Early Sporadic Connections to Lloyd Morgan’s Works
11 As mentioned in the introduction, Mead had known about Morgan’s works since the
1890s. He was critically interested in Morgan’s ideas and it would make sense that he
attended his lecture on “Instinct and Habit” at Chicago in 1895. Mead was at the time
increasingly involved with an experimentalist physiological perspective through which
he wanted to explain emotion and the organic evolution of habit, attention and mind.
In a letter to the Deweys of 1895, Mead reported some results of a research study on
stimulus and adaptation, arguing that he discovered the synthetic principle at the basis
of the development stated in biology, namely “that every advance is the response of the
organism to new or enlarged food supply i.e. a response to a stimulus not to an influence
” and that “adaptation of the sensomotor system, at anyone prior – distinguished from
the alimentary system can then take place only within the comparatively narrow limits
set by advance made in the alimentary system in response to the new stimulus.”13 He
then  concluded  that  his  discovery  would  have  allowed  him  to  “harmonize  Darwin
Weissmann Loeb,”  that  is,  to  harmonize  Darwin’s  idea  that  natural  selection needs
variation  and  the  heredity  of  at  least  a  part  of  it,  with  Weissmann’s  theory  of
hereditariness of germline cells independently from somatic cells and Loeb’s theory
that  environmental  factors  affect  growth,  development,  and  behaviour.14 In  other
words, Mead was convinced that he had discovered the synthetic principle of variation,
selection, and hereditariness, on which, as we have seen, Morgan was also working at
that time.15
12 In his 1895 review of An Introduction to Comparative Psychology, Mead welcomed Morgan’s
work as an attempted overcoming of the homocentric character of psychical analysis,
which has distorted comparative psychology. He also noted that the monism postulated
by Morgan was not really in contrast with his dualistic standpoint on the physical and
psychical  aspects,  which  could  be  regarded,  according  to  Morgan’s  analysis,
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indifferently as two aspects of the same curve or as simply running parallel with each
other.  Mead identified  that  Morgan’s  thought,  in  fact,  was  dominated by  analogies
between  the  two  aspects.  However,  as  he  specified,  such  analogies  were  just
“makeshift”:  an  expedient  carrying  with  them  much  error  for  being  incompletely
analysed and abstracted. He then highlighted the limit of the conceptual apparatus of
comparative  psychology  since  the  treatment  of  the  physical  and  the  psychic  was
addressed, with little success, in terms of analogy, without any attention to the purely
logical distinction between the physical and the psychic. He thus denounced the lack of
an in-depth analysis of the fundamental concepts, since the analogies were, to his eyes,
rather gimmicks than the explanations themselves and had the value of illustration
rather  than  true  knowledge  (Mead  1895b:  401).16 He  was  of  the  opinion  that
comparative psychology needed “a thoroughgoing analysis of its fundamental concepts
to  put  it  upon its  feet,”  by  freeing  its  tools,  “i.e.,  in  the  definite  formulation  of  a
psychological method as ultimately distinct from those of the physical and biological
sciences” (Mead 1895b: 400). 
13 In the following years, he developed his research with at the basis the idea that the
ontogenetic study of the mental phenomenon in human beings is closely intertwined
with the phylogenetic study of human consciousness in distinction from inferior forms
of life. Although Mead criticised the epistemological limits of Morgan’s comparative
psychology, from a methodological perspective which was similar to Morgan’s, Mead
found in the observation of behaviour an indispensable method for the study of the
psychic processes of the subject involved in the interactions with physical and social
environment. “Behaviour” became the key notion since it allowed to interpret psycho-
physical processes in a broader social perspective through which to analyse the social
act in which psychic phenomena were expressed.17 It has to be noted, however, that
even if the method of the observation of behaviour became a key element of Mead’s
social-behavioural approach to language and mind, he did not accept John B. Watson’s
reductionist approach.18 On the contrary, he believed that it was not possible to explain
psychic  phenomena  by  just  referring  to  external  behaviour,  and  regarded  “mental
behaviour” as just as functionally essential as non-mental behaviour to human conduct,
but partially explainable through the latter.
14 Mead’s  investigations  finally  resulted  in  a  bio-social  perspective  of  the  organic
continuity  of  the  physical  and the  psychical,  according to  which the  emergence of
minds and selves are rooted on the:
innate or hereditary […] physiological mechanism of the human central nervous
system, by means of which the genesis of minds and selves out of the human social
process of experience and behavior – out of the human matrix of social relations
and interactions-is made biologically possible in human individuals.  (Mead 2015:
237n)
15 This  perspective  was  in  line  with the  idea  Morgan expressed in  Emergent  Evolution,
according  to  which  in  any  organism  there  is  something  physiologically given  that
“affords only a physical basis on which there is founded the conscious reference that
supervenes” (see Morgan 1927: 107). Like Morgan, Mead also finally came to interweave
psychological reflections into a broader philosophical fabric in order to highlight the
close interdependence between the emerging nature of the psychic sphere with respect
to  physical  phenomena  and the  emerging  nature  of  the  knowledge  process  of  the
surrounding reality. 
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16 To better understand the precise connections between Mead and Morgan, let’s now
move on to their theories of emergence.
 
Evolution and Emergence: Morgan’s Emergentism and
Mead’s Processual Ontology
17 The Gifford Lectures, delivered in 1922, are Morgan’s philosophical explanation of the
evolution process which became a milestone of first-generation organicists. As already
mentioned,  his  idea,  elaborated  in  1890s,  that  advanced  states  of  consciousness
emerged from infra-conscious states corresponding to energy transformations in the
germ-plasm,  and  that  infra-consciousness  was  associated  with  all  forms  of  energy
accompanying brain action, forced Morgan to adopt a more fundamental monistic view
which,  however,  “brought  him  precipitously  close  to  the  brink  of  panpsychism,”
though eventually “did not hurtle him headlong into that doctrine” (see Richards 1977:
19-20). Thus, he thought the idea of an emergent evolution could be a solution to the
epistemological gap. He first used the term “emergence” in 1913 (Morgan 1913: 29-33),
referring to J. S. Mill’s and G. H. Lewes’ concepts of emergence.19 Hereafter Emergence
became  a  foundational  premise  to  address  from  a  philosophical  perspective  the
qualitative gaps between organisms and the evolutionary incongruities.20 In particular,
Morgan (1927) recognized the core role of the notion of emergence and he tried to
overcome  epistemological  associationism  by  moving  towards  an  evolutionary
epistemology that seemed more in line with the assumptions of an ontological monism,
showing his constructive dialogue with a number of contemporary figures who were
engaged more or less explicitly with the question of the “advent of novelty” (Morgan
1927:  2),  from  Samuel  Alexander  to  Henri  Bergson,  Alfred  North  Whitehead,  and
Bertrand Russell.
18 Some years later, in December 1930, Mead delivered the Paul Carus Lectures, in which
he sketched out a processual ontology that presented a bio-social account of emergence
similar  to  Morgan’s.  Similarly  to  Morgan’s  Emergent  Evolution,  one  of  the  dominant
strains of Mead’s Philosophy of the Present is the philosophy of nature considered as the
characteristic contribution of the Anglo-American philosophy of the 1920s, pioneered
by Alexander’s Space, Time, and Deity (1920).21 However, differently from Morgan, Mead
engaged  more  with  his  interpretations  of  Bergson’s  vitalism  and  Whitehead’s
hypothesis of the organization of perspectives in nature (Whitehead 1919; 1920; 1925),
as well as with an interpretation of the theory of relativity considered from a social
point  of  view.22 He  attempted  to  develop  a  synthesis  with  respect  to  the  possible
integration of his social-behavioural psychology with the theory of relativity, and to
avoid  a  psycho-physical  dualism  and  a  reductionist  naturalism.  It  is  therefore
comprehensible that he used a terminology that was more familiar to him. 
 
Relatedness and Sociality
19 In his lectures, Morgan proposed a doctrine of emergence that he considered “the very
antithesis”  to  any mechanistic  interpretation of  life  and mind (Morgan 1927:  8).  In
particular,  he  contended  that  in  evolution  all  emergent  events  proceed  on  the
hypothesis  that  “there is  a  natural,  coherent,  and consistent plan of  relatedness to
which  its  interpretation  has  reference.”  Therefore,  the  “emphasis  on  orderly
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relatedness  as  a  feature  of  reality  worthy  of  such  emphasis  forms  a  plank  in  the
platform  of  emergent  evolution”  whose  reality  has  “relatedness,  fundamentally
orderly” as a cardinal feature (ibid.: 181-3). Accordingly, emergence is some “new kind
of relation” (ibid.:  64), namely, a new entity that appears at each ascending step. As
Morgan argues:
That which becomes the stuff at the higher level of emergence is never quite what
it was at the lower level from which it was derived – otherwise one would have
resultants only and not emergence. Under emergent evolution there is progressive
development of  stuff  which becomes new stuff  in virtue of  the higher status to
which  it  has  been  raised  under  some  supervenient  kind  of  substantial
gotogetherness. (Ibid.: 192-3)
20 Morgan refers to the supervenience of new kinds of relatedness on the basis of which
the ways in which the lower-level events are involved run their course differently in
virtue of the presence of the supervenient event. So that, when life is supervenient, the
physical events involved run their course differently in virtue of its presence. He then
distinguishes  between intrinsic and extrinsic relatedness,  the  first  being that  “which
obtains wholly within any given system,” whereas the extrinsic relatedness is that of a
system to some other systems (ibid.: 19). In more general terms, any entity as such is an
instance of relatedness. A person, an organism, an atom, are instances of relatedness in
any concrete situation in which they play their part, each in respect to others. And “it
is  as  an  integral  whole  of  relatedness  that  any  individual  entity,  or  any  concrete
situation, is a bit of reality” (ibid.: 69). 
21 Within this framework, the passage from inorganic to organic life, and to mind, is part
of  an  emergent  evolution  in  due  historical  order.  Morgan  gives  a  diagrammatic
expression of emergent evolution as a pyramid (Figure 2) that responds to a double
constraint:  “(i)  that  imposed  by  the  constitutive  structure  of  nature;  and  (ii)  that
imposed by the regulative structure of a logical field as such” (ibid.: 179). So that each
higher entity in the ascending series is  an emergent “complex” of many entities of
lower grades, within which a new kind of relatedness provides integral unity.
 
Figure 1
22 Life and mind are unified with the material and emerge through natural departures in
the evolutionary passage of physicochemical events. Emergent evolution is “merely the
recognition  that  new phases  of  the  same  underlying  stuff  have  radically  different,
unpredictable characteristics, and that these traits have come about seemingly de novo
over the course of time” (Peterson 2016: 74). So that which is recognized as conscious
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life, sentience, even logic, evolves as reconfigurations in the way the underlying mind-
stuff relates to itself:
When two or more kinds of events, […] as A, B, and C, co-exist on one complex
system in such wise that the C kind involves the co-existence of B, and B in like
manner involves A, whereas the A-kind does not involve the co-existence of B, nor
B that of C, we may speak of C, as, in this sense, higher than B, and B than A. Thus,
for  emergent  evolution,  conscious  events  at  level  C  (mind)  involve  specific
physiological events at level B (life),  and these involve specific physico-chemical
events at level A (matter). No C without B, and no B without A. No mind without
life; and no life without “a physical basis.” (Morgan 1927: 15)
23 New stages of emergence are not discontinuous to the previous one, so that reflective
consciousness involves as its natural basis a lower plane of consciousness, which is at
the infra-conscious level. This level is unreflective and perceptual, and in like manner
involves  a  basis  of  life  on  which  it  is  founded;  and  this  again  involves  a  physico-
chemical basis on which it, in turn, is founded. So that in proceeding downwards in the
pyramid of emerging evolution, the ultimate basis is a world of purely physical events
(and their correlates) in the changing spatial and temporal relationship. But the way in
which natural  events  take  place  at  each level  depends  “on the  kind of  relatedness
supervenient  at  that  level”  (ibid.:  60).  In  other  words,  there  are  different
epistemological levels from which to regard entities in relation. In the universe as a
natural  system all  relatedness  is  intrinsic;  on  the  other  hand,  for  an  electron as  a
physical unit, all relatedness is extrinsic. Within any given instance of relatedness the
terms and their relation are homogeneous. That is to say that relation is continuous
and the events are fluent in nature. The same is true with the time-interval between
two  moments:  it  is  “just  the  temporal  relation  that  it  is”  (ibid.:  75).  Space-time  is
intrinsic and extrinsic to physical events but not a priori to them. The fluency of events
is in that which is methodologically conceived as a space-time frame. In this frame, no
relation  is  divisible.  But  it  is  possible  that  under  some  method  of  conventional
treatment, say that of mathematics, an indivisible spatial or temporal distance may be
co-related with a  “stretch,”  that  is  with an extension (a  kind of  specious  present),
which is divisible and may comprise as many terms as we choose to make therein. 
24 Under internal relations things in some ways change in their intrinsic nature under
causal influence.  For  instance,  when  moon  and  earth  are  set  in  a  joint  field  of
gravitative  relatedness,  each is  intrinsically  changed through the differential  strain
that results, with tidal deformation of some measure. The external relations, on the
other hand, do not make any difference to the things as things. For instance, whether a
book be on the shelf or on the table makes no difference whatever to the book as a
thing,  which  is  what  it  is  in  this  respect.  However,  regarded  as  a  place-term  in
homogeneous relatedness with another such term, its position between two others on
the shelf is quite different from that which it holds when it lies on my desk. In this
sense,  its  “positional  status  is  of  the  so-called  internal  order;  and its  character,  as
spatial term in this respect (not, of course, as thing), is thus determined” (ibid.: 78). 
25 Now,  Mead’s  idea,  in  fact  very  similar  to  Morgan’s,  was  that  of  a  connection,  of  a
“relatedness,” among factors that are part of an evolutionary process which allows the
possibility  of  new events  to  emerge.  In  his  theory  of  emergence  he  uses  the  term
“social” with a similar meaning as Morgan uses the term “relational.”23 According to
Mead, in fact, the world is a complex of emerging events that develops diachronically,
and it is important to pay attention to what preceded what is taking place so that “the
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direction of temporal progress may determine what the world is going to be” (Mead
2002: 45). In this frame, in which the emerging/continuous dialectic is played out, the
evolutionary process allows the possibility of qualitatively new events, which when they
happen  appear  discontinuous,  but  which  the  process  of  adaptation  links  to  the
continuous process of evolution through a reconstruction that involves both the event
and its structural context. Every new element diverts the direction of the future and
evolutionary history towards unpredictable paths and at the same time determines a
reinterpretation of the past – seen as the set of determining conditions in the light of
the new element that has emerged.
26 Mead referred to the principle of sociality as an explanatory principle of the dynamic
interaction between the acting perspectives, trying to give an experiential reading of
the  temporality  of  thought.  In  fact,  he  argued  that  the  process  of  the  emergent
phenomenon  is  displayed  in  a  diachronic extension  of  the  present  in  which  the
dimensions of past and future are included in the light of emerging novelty, and as a
function of the conditioned and the conditioning. In particular, at the opening of his
Carus Lectures, Mead claimed that “reality exists in a present” (ibid.:  35),  the latter
being  “a  certain  temporal  process  going  on  in  experience”  (ibid.:  45).  Referring  to
Bergson’s notion of “duration” (Bergson 1910), he notes that the present always implies
the interweaving of the different elements of a state, not only in the sense that what is
taking place extends to what comes next, but also in a rather more “pragmatic” sense,
according to which such interweaving is at the root of meaning and value in things
(Mead 1936: 297). The present is, therefore, a temporal diffusion of events extended
enough to make it possible for the event to be what it is; or, as Whitehead (1925: 104)
would have said, the event realizes itself as a totality “within the specious presents.” One
event is distinguished from another for its being a becoming which affects the inner
nature of that event.24 A present, in contrast with the abstraction of mere passage, is
not a fragment cut outside the temporal dimension of the uniform becoming of reality.
Its  primary  reference  is  “to  the  emerging  event,  i.e.,  the  occurrence  of  something
which is  more than the  processes  that  have led up to  it  and which by  its  change,
continuance, or disappearance, adds to later passages a content that they would not
otherwise have possessed” (Mead 2002: 52). The social nature of the present arises out
of its emergence. Identifying sociality with this result is merely identifying it with the
system. If emergence is a characteristic of reality, this phase of adjustment, which takes
place between the ordered universe before the emergent arose and the universe after it
coming to terms with the newcomer,  must also be a characteristic of  reality.  Mead
refers to “the phase betwixt and between the old and the new system” (ibid.: 73). The
social is, then, “the capacity of being several things at once” (ibid.: 75). In Mead’s view,
the  essential  nature  of  the  present  is  therefore  emergent  in  its  becoming  and
disappearance, and in the process of readjustment that the emergent implies. As Bella
argues,  the events that emerge thus reveal “a social  form precisely in the perceived
actuality of their emergence and directed with respect to the present.” In this form, the
past is “the conditioning that, preserving previous systemic relations, emerges in the
present from the way in which the relationship between events develops and, in part,
the condition for the development of the reality that is immediately imminent” (Bella
2016: 66). 
27 Similarly to Morgan, Mead contended that any variation that occurs in the world is a
qualitative novelty that finds the conditions of its emergence in the relational context
in which it  originates,  and in turn reconstructs  the same context  starting from an
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evolutionary  novelty  which cannot  be  reduced  to  its  conditions.  However,  it  is
important  to  note  that  differently  to  Morgan,  Mead  does  not  admit  a  teleological
perspective. According to Morgan, in fact, emergent evolution is the expression of an
orderly and progressive development of nature in which the new emerging character,
namely some new kind of relatedness among pre-existing events, is unpredictable before
its appearing, for “ex hypothesis, there are no such events as yet in existence” (Morgan
1927: 6). However, Morgan specified, “if there be a natural plan of emergence, then
every effect is strictly determinate in accordance with the nature of that plan.” Novelty
itself shall be mentioned under the rubric of causation, being “caught up in the web of
causal nexus under suitable acknowledgment.” This means that unpredictability is not
due to the nature of novelty, rather to “our partial knowledge of the plan of emergence
up to date, and our necessary ignorance of what the further development of that plan
will be” (ibid.: 282). There is, in other words, a “natural plan” that we cannot know a
priori, but that is part of the causal nexus explicable by a causal explanation, once that
novelty  has  emerged.  To  Morgan’s  idea  of  relatedness  is  thus  linked  the  relation
between logical sense and natural direction. There is a sense of the relation which is
characteristic also of the logical relation. Where we are dealing with some passage of
events, in objective regard, the logical sense is accordant with the direction of passage.
There is, in other words, a diachronic connection which has an evolutionary origin.
However, even where there is an onward flow of events in the space-time frame that we
construct  for  their  interpretation,  we  may think  of  them either  as  downstream or
upstream, forwards or backwards.
28 Differently  from Morgan,  Mead  considers  the  single  act  to  be  teleological,  not  the
natural order. The conditions of the emergence, while necessary, do not determine in
its full reality that which emerges, but are present in it. Thus, although the emerging
event is conditioned by the past, it cannot be deduced from it, nor can it be causally
reduced to it. And since the present is not entirely determined by past conditions, the
past did not contain the present when it appeared. The past is in continuity with the
present only a posteriori, through a reconstruction that selects the conditions for the
explanation  and  justification  of  the  emergent.  Between  emergent  event  and  the
conditions  under  which  it  occurs,  there  is  a  causal  relation which  sets  up  a  history
relative to that event that can be seen as a historical emergence.25 This means that the
emergent event is not caught up in the web of a causal nexus, exactly because there is
not, according to Mead, a “natural plan of emergence” (so that every effect is strictly
determinate in accordance with the nature of the plan), and the emergent event is not
new only because of our “necessary ignorance of what the further development of that
plan will be” (Morgan 1927: 282). What the environment or social structure represents
is a “statement of the world out of which the emergent has arisen, and consequently
the conditions under which the emergent must exist, even though this emergence has
made a different world through its appearance” (Mead 2002: 69). The world has become
a different world because of the event, and the “new” world, that is the new system of
relations, retroacts changing the previous laws.
 
Minded Behaviour 
29 Another  similitude  between  Morgan’s  and  Mead’s  theories  of  emergence  is  the
centrality attributed to behaviour and perception in the explanation of the emergence
of the mind and selves.
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30 Morgan’s  phylogenetic  explanation  of  the  emergence  of  consciousness  is  in  fact
repeated in his ontogenetic explanation,  in which individual consciousness emerges
from lower  levels  at  different  stages.  According to  Morgan,  there  is  a  stage  in  the
individual development of an organism at which consciousness is eventually emergent,
when  there  are  sensory  presentations  that  carry  no  meaning;  at  such  a  stage  a
behaviouristic  interpretation  is  sufficient  to  catch  what  happens,  even  if  we
acknowledge psychical correlates. Behaviour towards “this or that thing,” in fact, is the
“natural progenitor under emergent evolution, of conscious reference to this or that 
object.” However, behaviour does not initially “depend on conscious reference” (Morgan
1927: 107). One has therefore to distinguish between the primary behaviour on the level
of life and the secondary, that is, “minded” behaviour which “seeks and finds again on
the plane of consciousness.” But Morgan specifies that the behaviourist “will not allow”
such a “minded” behaviour (ibid.: 110). It is worth noting that Morgan explicitly refers
to the “behaviourist” for he is decidedly criticising Watson’s reductionist version of
behaviourism. By referring to “minded behaviour” he, probably unknowingly, was in
line with Mead’s version of behaviourism, according to which it is not possible to deny
the  functional  role  of  consciousness.  Mead  uses  in  fact  the  expression  “mental
behaviour” to highlight thinking processes (Mead 2015). More specifically, Mead (1936:
392 ff.)  distinguished  a  double  perspective  from  which  to  consider  the  notion  of
“behavior”: the Watsonian perspective, which considered the process of the organism
from an external point of view, and the Deweyan perspective, which also included in
human behavior the different values associated with the notion of “consciousness.”
This  second  perspective,  based  on  the  organic  circuit  theory  (Dewey  1896),  which
interpreted consciousness in functional terms as an experience of the interaction of the
individual with the physical and social environment, made it possible to overcome the
reductionist pattern of stimulus-response – an echo of the ancient dualism between
sensation  and idea  –  and to  consider  human conduct  as  the  active  product  of  the
inhibition  of  actions  initially  related  to  physiological  impulses. The  peculiarity  of
human  consciousness  results  therefore  strictly  from  its  intertwinement  with  a
physiological system. In particular, thanks to the elaboration of a theory of perception
that  indicated  in  the  manipulative  capacity  the  bio-social  element  of  connection
between higher physiological and cognitive processes, and in the cooperative process
of behavioural interaction based on primitive social instincts (Mead 2001) the condition
of possibility of learning shared meanings, Mead managed to overcome the limits of
psychophysical parallelism (Mead 1908; 1938). The experience of manipulation marks
the border between animal and human perceptive abilities.  Thanks to manipulation
organism form a perceptive consciousness of  the sensible stimulus,  giving rise to a
meaning of the object manipulated. In this framework, the mind is the evolutionary
result  of  a  transfer  of  the significant  behavioural-based  semantic  from  something
external and physical, that is fully implemented in the field of social experience and in
the individuals’ inner space of a symbolic-based semantic.
31 This  is  a  further  element  that  allows  us  to  assimilate  Morgan’s  theory  to  Mead’s
explanation of  the  genesis  of  the  mind and selves.26 Unknowingly  in  line  with this
perspective, in fact, Morgan argued that what is perceptually minded is “a set of signs,
[…]  which  primarily,  for  purpose  of  behaviour,  are  referred  to  centres  of  physical
effluence thereby signified” (Morgan 1927: 196). To “perceive” as well as to “mind” the
world is to attribute to it some practical meaning, which can be an unreflective or a
reflective meaning. The first has immediate utility for practical behaviour, whereas the
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second  has  mediate  value  for  conduct.  As  Morgan  argues,  through  its  relation  to
meaning the presentation of the object is raised to the level of a percept which “is not a
resultant but an emergent with a quality which is genuinely new.” In other words, “no
meaning,  no percept;  and no perception,  no object  thereof” (ibid.:  98).  Accordingly,
there is no separation between the sensory nucleus that is given in presentation and
something  else  that  is  revived  in  re-presentation.  They  are  what  is  minded  under
perception and can only be distinguished under analysis. The image is hence an image
of the object,  the name of which is  a sign.  The sign has reference to that which is
signified and “shall serve as a guide to behaviour towards the thing that is signified”
(ibid.: 238). To express it differently, the sign has a behavioural character. This implies
that some properties of an object belong wholly to the acknowledged thing and their
very existence demands a relatedness with persons and with their way of behaving
accordingly. 
32 Nevertheless,  Morgan’s  explanation of  the link between sign and behaviour is  very
lacking and superficial. He does not offer any answer to the question of the passage
from a pre-linguistic semantics to a linguistic one, i.e. symbolic-conceptual, leaving the
question unresolved and in so doing recurring in the old associationist perspective.
Mead, by contrast, offers a perspective that provides a hypothesis that is still relevant
today.27 In  particular,  he  refers  to  gestures as  communicative  devices  in  the  triadic
relation  between  organisms,  and  between  organisms  and  environment.  Through
gestures, seen as organic preparations for action, the cooperative acts emerge, in the
sense that the individual’s gestural and vocal responses arise in answer to indications
of various movements performed by other individuals of the group. In other words,
gestural conversation expresses a kind of “self-socialization” process of the organism.
Such a process depends on the organism’s bio-social mechanism of simulation of social
response (Mead 1964: 100; 140): imaginative ability and the social context in which it is
situated  are  the  two  components  developed  thanks  to  the  evolution  of  gestural
interactions (Mead 2015: 45-7).
 
A Perspective Ontology of Selves
33 Even  if  the  physical  world  exists  independently  of  any  sensory  acquaintance,  it  is
nowise  affected by  individual’s  perception of  it,  and in  particular  by  her  seeing it.
Morgan believed that so far as the outer world functions as a term in the cognitive
relation, that is as percept, it is what it is in virtue of that relation, and as such it takes
its status in internal relatedness. As a term under such relatedness its esse is percipi, but
only as term, not coincidently as thing. In other words, it is what Mead would have
called “the world that is there” (Mead 1938), which, however, qua minded, is founded
primarily on the correlated outcome of receptor-patterns, and it is the outcome of a
prolonged evolutionary process in which “vision has come to play the leading role,” but
it is co-related with other modes of sensory experience, especially “that of contact-
treatment  founded  on  the  more  primitive  data  of  touch  supplemented by
manipulation” (Morgan 1927: 47).
34 From the ontogenetic perspective, both Morgan and Mead assumed the hypothesis of
psycho-physical correlation, arguing that at each level there is one kind of relatedness
which can be distinguished as correlation. Consciousness is therefore a quality of the
person, as a mind-body correlation. Mind emerges within the personal system, and all
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that  is  minded  is  intrinsic  to  the  psychical  system,  belonging  to  the  bio-graphy  of
persons. Thus, if we consider a person as a mind-body system, there are many events
that concur at all levels of reality. There are physio-chemical events, organic events,
conscious events, all of which are integrated in the running of the system as a whole
and their quasi-independence can only be considered via conceptual analysis. A person
is at once part of the natural system (physical laws and neuro-biological states, or what
Morgan  called  “life”)  which  makes  her  locomotion  possible,  and  part  of  the  social
system which is a part of the life system. As Mead puts it:
The point is that a body belonging to a system, and having its nature determined by
its relations to members of that system, when it passes into a new systematic order
will carry over into its process of readjustment in the new system something of the
nature of all members of the old. So in the history of a community, the members
carry over from an old order their characters as determined by social relations into
the readjustments of social change. The old system is found in each member and in
a revolution becomes the structure upon which the new order is established. (Mead
2002: 77)
35 It  is  interesting  to  note  that  like  Mead,  Morgan also  contended that  a  person is  a
different term in each different relation. She becomes a new term, and in this becoming
the  terms  “spring  into  existence  with  the  relations  as  such  in  the  course  of
evolutionary progress” (Morgan 1927: 73). The persons are in relations like the earth
and the moon are in gravitational relation, and for science they are just gravitational
terms within the universe of discourse. It is not a question of what they are “made of,”
but of the nature of their relatedness. The terms are applied to persons or things in
virtue of the offices they hold in relation to other persons or things. 
36 Like Morgan, Mead refers to the theory of relativity to analogically stress sociality as a
constitutive feature of the natural and human world. He argued that the relativity of
space and time with respect to the reference systems and the order in which events
take  place  would  imply  a  perspective  ontology in  which  individuals  organize  in  the
present  the  events  from  their  space-time  point  of  view  and reproduce  their  own
schemes of action in the passage, acting in reality according to their perspectives.28 The
order, however, is not arbitrary, i.e., subjectivistic, but it is in all respects constitutive
of reality, precisely because reality itself is patient with such sentient individuals and is
given according to their perspectives. In other words, although the theory of relativity
conceives for each individual his own space-time world between these worlds, there is
some uniformity that leads us to conceive the need to constitute a reality of events and
interrelations  that  underlie  our  experience  and that  lead  us  to  make  these  worlds
coincide through the agreement of different perspectives. As Mead argues:
The  conduct  of  the  conscious  organism  is  determined  both  by  a  physiological
system from behind and also by a consciousness which reaches into the future. This
can, of course, take place only in a present in which both the conditioning past and
the  emergent  future  are  to  be  found;  but,  as  these  problems  indicate,  what  is
further called for is the recognition that in the present the location of the object in
one system places it in the others as well. It is this which I have called the sociality
of the present. If we examine the situation from the standpoint of relativity, we see
that the very motion that is taking place within the system at rest carries with it a
different spatiotemporal  structure,  which is  responsible  for  an increase of  mass
within the system at rest. If we translate this into the other two situations, we see a
biochemical process arising which we call life, but which so changes the conditions
under which it  goes on that there arises in nature its environment;  and we see
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living forms selecting those past conditions which lead to future maintenance of
life and thus introducing values and later meanings into nature. (Mead 2002: 86)29
37 What is peculiar to human intelligence, therefore, is the ability to reorganize in the
body the elements that in novelty confront the elements previously present, and then
to reconstruct the environment in the light of the new situation. In this framework,
human  consciousness  is  both  the  difference  that  emerges  in  the  environment  in
relation  to  the  organism  in  the  process  of  change  (which  concerns  the  change  of
meaning  that  the  environment  assumes  towards  an  organism),  and  the  difference
occurring in the organism because of the change occurring in the environment, and in
social interaction (ibid.: 36-8). 
38 To sum up, for both Morgan and Mead the world is there but in the cognitive regard of
consciousness  the  world  is  there  in  reference to  the  consciousness.  The  emergent
process is therefore strictly related to selves and their behavioural relation to social
and natural environments. According to Mead, the process that constitutes the reality
of  a  living  being  is  “one  that  extends  beyond  the  form  itself  and  involves  for  its
expression the  world  within  which this  form lives.  The  reality  of  the  process  thus
belongs to the world in its relation to the living being.” (Ibid.: 66). And emergent events
are related to habits and selective attitudes of individuals and their minds, that is to
“the  larger  environment  which  the  activity  of  the  organism  calls  for  but  which
transcends the present” (ibid.: 54). Sociality provides the aptitudes of anticipation and
emergence is only given in the social act. Individual perspectives are indeed always
acting perspectives, for just by acting intentionally individuals become social members,
that is  they enter into reality and life.  Human intentionality and consciousness are
thence  part  of  a  dynamic  and  evolutionary  framework,  for  once  the  relational-
organisation of lower-level elements is presupposed, coherence between emergentist
conception of reality and naturalist explanation of the emergence of consciousness can
be found. As Mead argues, no one has a mind that works isolated from the process of
social life in which it has arisen or emerged, and in the course of which the model of
organized social behaviour has been fundamentally impressed upon it.30 It is, in other
words, the idea of a functional perspectival approach to reality, which also Morgan seems
to contend:
the same entity – Morgan writes – may stand in many relations and may function as
just so many different terms in different and co-existent fields of relatedness. This
does not mean that an entity is other than a system of terms in intrinsic relations,
for herein lies a mark of its reality. It means rather that we are to take this for
granted so that we may analytically distinguish some special part that it plays in
some wider field of relatedness. (Morgan 1927: 178)
39 From an emergent evolution perspective, among the qualities of a thing there are the
expressive character of the purely spatio-temporal order (figure, size, motions), of the
physico-chemical, physiological, and, psychical relatedness, qua intrinsic – “all those
characters  which  give  to  a  thing,  an  organism,  or  a  person,  its  status  in  the
evolutionary hierarchy” (ibid.: 186). But there is also the extrinsic relatedness with the
persons that use them and the functions they can have. 
 
Conclusion
40 As I  have tried to argue in this  article,  there are some interconnections and many
similarities  between  Morgan’s  and  Mead’s  works.  In  particular,  they  began  their
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psychological and philosophical journeys at the same area of interests and confronted
the same issues related to evolutionary theory. They reached a point at the end of their
journeys  where  they  were  focusing  their  attention  on  the  same  philosophical
hypothesis, but giving thought to different solutions. According to Morgan’s idea of
emergent  evolution,  when  basic  physical  processes  achieve  a  certain  level  of
complexity of an appropriate kind, genuinely novel characteristics emerge that could
not  be  predicted  from  a  complete  knowledge  of  the  lower-level  parts  and  their
relations. There is, moreover, a perspectival approach to reality, according to which
the  ontological  independence  of  reality  is  epistemological  dependent  on  the
supervenient consciousness which enters into relation with it,  so that  the meaning
relates  to the way in which things enter into relation with persons.  Moreover,  the
emergence of novelty itself should be understood as a fully natural process, so that no
extra-natural force is necessary. Emergent evolution is the expression of an orderly and
progressive development, ranked among the “laws of nature,” though not predictable
before the novelty is emerged. The laws of nature are an expression of some natural
plan  behind  emergent  evolution,  a  sort  of  “God’s  plan,”  so  that  once  the  novelty
emerges, it is possible to know the hidden natural law behind it. 
41 In  Philosophy  of  the  Present,  Mead  moves  on  similar  paths,  synthesizing  his  social
psychology with processual philosophy and the activity which structures the reality
that the organism inhabits. Emergence as an evolutionary relational process that can
only be explained a posteriori was the notion he tried to elaborate through a synthesis
with respect  to  the  possible  integration of  his  social  psychology and the  theory of
relativity.  His aim was,  similar to Morgan, to avoid any psycho-physical  dualism or
reductionist  naturalism  as  well  as  any  teleological  plan.  In  particular,  the  greater
attention Mead devoted to the social  aspect  of  the emergent event led him to link
emergent events to the habits and selective attitudes of the selves. In turn, his theory
of mind and self as emergent phenomena of the social processes better reconciled the
discontinuity of the qualitatively distinct emerging events with the continuity of the
evolutionary  process.  In  particular,  Mead  reconciled  the  discontinuity of  emerging
events (as qualitatively distinct from the organizational structures from which they
emerge), with the continuity of the evolutionary process and the old conditions of the
past.31 The attention to the triadic relationship between organism, natural and social
environment  led  Mead  to  interpret  the  psycho-physical  processes  from  a  broader
perspective, according to which human evolution occurred at a social emergent level
not  reducible  to  terms of  the  biological  characteristics  of  the  individuals  involved.
However, unlike Morgan’s idea of a finalistic nature, Mead proposes an anti-finalistic
teleological perspective, according to which the emergent, though part of the process,
is something really new and not the result of a divine plan. 
42 Both authors, made strong and original contributions to the evolutionary epistemology
of their time,  work which I  think,  has still  much to offer to the current debate on
emergence  and  evolutionary  epistemology.  Mead’s  theory  of  emergence  has  to  be
considered,  in my opinion,  at  the basis  of  his  theory of  the evolution of  mind and
language.  Moreover,  as  El  Hani  and  Pihlström (2002)  have  argued,  Mead’s  anti-
reductionist  naturalism,  together  with  that  of  Dewey,  is  so  closely  related  to
emergentist  thought  that  they  should  be  taken  into  account  as  some  of  the  most
creative representatives of emergentism. 
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NOTES
1. In the preface, Lloyd Morgan writes to “be glad to learn that further observations […] on habit
and instinct  will  probably  form part  of  Prof.  Whitman’s  work at  an  experimental  station in
connection with the Biological Department of Chicago University.” (Morgan 1896). See Richards
1977.  As evolutionary biologist,  Whitman was interested in particular in the study of  animal
behavior, and he came to formulate the idea that instinctive behavior patterns, just like organic
structures, can be used in reconstructing phylogenies (Whitman 1899). Konrad Lorenz “would
later call this idea the founding concept of twentieth-century ethology, the ‘Archimedean point’
on  which  comparative  behavior  studies  turned”  (Burkhardt  1999:  497).  On  Whitman’s
contribution to the development of American Biology see among others Burckhardt 1999, Pauly
1994, Maienschein 1988, Davenport 1917.
2. As  Pauly  (1987:  67)  argues,  Whitman’s  entrepreneurial  concern to  organize  biology,  while
antedating his arrival in Chicago, fit easily into Dewey’s general framework. He was typical in
arguing that “through cooperative institutions, such as the University of Chicago and the Marine
Biological Laboratory, scientists would be able to communicate and coordinate their seemingly
disparate individual labors, thereby creating higher intellectual syntheses than would be possible
in more primitive social surroundings.” He was intellectually concerned with the principles of
progressive  evolution  and  once  recruited  at  Chicago  in  1892,  he  appointed  among  other
colleagues, the physiologist Jacques Loeb.
3. For a recognition see Clayton & Davies 2006, and the introduction to this Symposia.
4. On this point see also Peterson (2016: ch. 1). Only four years before, in The Law of Psychogenesis
(Morgan 1892a), Morgan published an associationist theory of consciousness and psychogenesis
with  some  references  to  James’s  functionalism.  In  that  article,  he  analysed  the  reflex-act,
regarding consciousness as developed in the loop-line between stimulus and response, claiming
that as consciousness becomes more complex through an increasing body of representative state
of consciousness, “it comes to symbolise in mental terms the occurrences both on the side of
stimulus and on the side of response” (Morgan 1892a: 72). Morgan also quoted James’s Principles
of Psychology to argue that the mechanism of control exercised by consciousness is at the basis of
the ideal action, which is an “action in the line of greatest resistance” (James 1890, II: 549).
5. It  has  to  be  specify,  however,  that  although  Morgan  refers  to  “biogenesis”  and  “genetic
phases” of natural evolution in Instinct and Experience (Morgan 1912), the word gene is not a
Morgan’s word. It was Johannsen in 1909 who coined the term “gene.” Even though Mendel was
hypothesizing,  already  in  1866,  the  hereditary  behavior  of  miniscule  hidden  factors  or
determinants underlying the stably inherited visible characteristics of an organism, which today
we would call genes, he never used the word “gene.”
6. See Sober 2005: 88; Thomas 1998. Morgan first formulated the canon in 1892 (Morgan 1892c).
Though  Morgan  aimed  to  avoid  errors  of  over-interpretation  of  animal  behaviour  (i.e.
anthropomorphic explanations), he also believed, differing from the successive radicalisations of
his principle carried out in behaviourism, that man could interpret the psychology of animals
only  in  his  own  terms.  After  all,  as Adler  noted,  it  was  here  that  Morgan  “had  first  hand
knowledge,  especially  through  investigations  of  his  own  mental  processes,  which  included
studies  of  their  nature  and  of  their  sequential  progress”  (Adler  1973:  41).  On  Morgan’s
contribution to the foundation of the modern comparative psychology see Fitzpatrick & Goodrich
2017; Arnet 2019.
7. The notion of energy was at that time crucial for Morgan’s theory of mental evolution. Though
at that time British scientists and engineers – William Thomson, J. P. Joule, W. J. M. Rankine, and
J. C. Maxwell – were formulating a new science of energy during the nineteenth century, it is
more  plausible  that  Morgan  referred  to  the  concept  of  “psychodynamics”  of  the  German
physiologist Ernst Wilhelm von Brücke who formulated in coordination with physicist Hermann
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von  Helmholtz  the  theory  on  the  conservation  of  energy.  Morgan  introduced  the  notion  of
energy in the article on Mental Evolution, in which he contended that consciousness is a product of
brain,  meaning by the  term “product”  the fact  that  it  is  “called into  existence” by physical
processes  (Morgan 1892b:  163).  His  hypothesis,  already published in his  1891 Animal  Life  and
Intelligence (Morgan 1891-1892), was that as material structure has evolved from lower forms of
matter, and organic forms of energy from lower forms of energy, so mental states evolve from
lower forms of  infra-consciousness,  that  is,  from “what is  of  the same order of  existence as
consciousness, but has not yet risen to the level of consciousness” (Morgan 1892b: 172). 
8. It is noteworthy that the same theory was developed in the very same year by James Mark
Baldwin, under the name of “organic selection” (Baldwin 1896). See on this Pertile (2019: 28).
9. Morgan’s ambiguity is even more evident in the definition of experience that he proposes. On
this point see also Instinct and Experience (Morgan 1912). It would be interesting to consider the
similarities  between Morgan’s  and James’  notion of  experience.  It  is  in  fact  most  likely  that
Morgan’s  concept  of  “experience”  derived  from  James’s  psychology.  However,  it  is  not  the
intention of this article to go into this aspect in greater depth. On James’s ontology see Bella
2019; Duvernoy 2015.
10. See Richards (1988: 381-5).
11. In other words, neural processes and states of consciousness are radically and absolutely “
distinguishable but not separable” elements (Morgan 1892b: 169; 173).
12. As he wrote: “According to the monistic hypothesis, every mode of kinesis has its concomitant
mode of metakinesis, and when the kinetic manifestations assume the form of the molecular processes in
the human brain, the metakinetic manifestations assume the form of human consciousness.” (Morgan
1891-1892:  467).  To  better  understand Morgan’s  distinction  between metakinetic  and  kinetic
manifestations one has to take into account that Morgan’s epistemological perspective before
1894 sought to promote an empiricist attitude; however, his approach was still contaminated by
an old-fashioned empiricism together with a Kantian mood (ibid.: 473). So that, in perceiving an
object, the mental process (that is, the perception) is considered as “the metakinetic equivalent
of certain kinetic changes among the brain-molecules” (ibid.: 473).
13. George Herbert Mead to John & Alice Chipman Dewey (1895.03.24), in Dewey 1997.
14. Loeb, Dewey and Mead were colleague for eight years at Chicago. Dewey’s correspondence
indicates, furthermore, that the Loebs and Meads were personally close and Huebner recently
showed that Mead was directly in dialogue with Loeb’s comparative physiology and psychology
(see Huebner 2014: 259).  During that time, Dewey and Loeb families became well acquainted.
“They lived near each other, Anne Loeb and Alice Dewey had similar backgrounds and interests,
and the Loeb and Dewey children were “pals.” The Loebs sent their oldest son Leonard to the
Deweys’ laboratory school soon after it opened in 1896.” In the 1890s Dewey considered Loeb in
some respects as “the single most important live model […] of the scientific inquirer” (Pauly
1987: 68). According to Dalton (2002: 70): “Loeb provided Dewey a sophisticated understanding of
the  intricate  interrelationships  between  environmental  influences,  biological  processes  of
growth,  and  learning.  Loeb’s  studies  suggested  to  Dewey  that  given  appropriate  stimulation
during early development, each child could best employ the resources of his or her environment
to fulfill that child’s individual potential for learning and creativity.”
15. In his letter to the Deweys he also referred to an article on the “Appearance of the Mammals”
which unfortunately never appeared. This research was related to other work on emotion and
the organic circuit that he was carrying out with Dewey (see Dewey 1894, 1895; Mead 1895a). In
the letter Mead mentioned also the appointment of Addison W. Moore to a position as laboratory
assistant of James Angell. The first result of this appointment was an experiment on “Habit and
Attention,” which Angell and Moore had been conducting since March 1895, the results of which
they published (in the same issue of the Psychological Review where Dewey published The Reflex Arc
Concept in Psychology (1896) the first statement of functionalist psychology). In the article they
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credit  both Dewey and Mead for  the guidance provided for  the interpretation of  the results
presented. It would be interesting also to explore the relationships of Mead and Morgan with
Baldwin, who was working on the same issues in the same years. However we cannot delve here
with this topic. I intend to address this issue in a possible next contribution.
16. The  question  about  the  epistemological  and  methodological  autonomy  of  experimental
psychology, human and comparative, was not new. Some years before Morgan and Mead, Wundt
devised the method of comparative psychology as analogous to the study of the human psyche,
having  indicated  that  the  psychic  life  of  animals  was  similar  to  that  of  man  and  therefore
knowable by analogy through the observation of the phenomena of the human consciousness,
which reveals  itself  as the immutable unit  of  measurement,  according to which only we can
measure psychic life (Wundt [1863] 1906).
17. In two articles published in the 1920s, “A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol”
(1922 [1964]) and “The Genesis of the Self and Social Control” (1924-1925 [1964]), and in social
psychology lectures at the University of Chicago (Mead [1934] 2015), Mead repeatedly stressed
the  importance  of  using  behavioural  psychology  to  understand the  psychic  processes  of  the
human being.
18. In 1913, in fact, Watson published Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, in which he
tried to extend the principles and methods of comparative psychology to the study of human
beings and staunchly advocated the use of conditioning in research.
19. See Blitz 1992. For a historical overview on the notion of emergence in those author see
Parravicini 2019.
20. As Peterson argues: “Even in physiologically similar organisms, psychological gaps manifested
themselves. Physiological common descent Lloyd Morgan could continue to regard as an a priori
truth. Behavior gaps between organisms, however, could not be dismissed so easily.  But how
could we explain these apparent gaps? In answering this question, Lloyd Morgan struck upon the
idea  of  emergentism that,  together  with  his  commitment  to  monism,  became  a  foundational
premise of the ‘third way’.” (Peterson 2016: 73).
21. See Murphy (2002: 14).
22. On the comparison between Mead and Whitehead see in particular Bella 2016. On Whitehead
and Alexander see Brioschi 2013.
23. I believe that one issue to be explored in Mead is the distinction between the social and the
relational. The use he makes of the term “social” is indeed problematic, since Mead attributes to
it  a  wide  range  of  meanings  varying  from  interactions  between  animal  organisms  to
institutionalised forms of  human society.  However,  it  is  not  possible  here to  expand on this
aspect, which I intend to address in a later work.
24. See Whitehead (1919: 22-3). See Mead (2002: 173-4). See on this point also Smith 2010.
25. “All of the past is in the present as a conditioning nature of passage, and all the future arises
out of the present as the unique events that transpire.” (Mead 2002: 62).
26. See also Cahoone 2019.
27. See McNeill 2005; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2006.
28. See Stone 2013.
29. Although Mead refers  to  the  theory  of  relativity,  it  has  to  be  noticed  that  he  does  not
unquestionably accept it.  First,  he notes that it is not the only explanation for the relational
dimension of reality, as seen above; Newton’s theory also offered a common relational structure.
30. Mead (1938: 150-1).
31. See Parravicini 2016.
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ABSTRACTS
The article aims to make a contribution to the contemporary debate on emergence by focusing
on Conwy Lloyd Morgan’s and George Herbert Mead’s theories of emergence. Both authors, in
fact, first elaborated a theory that tried to synthesize the biological, the psycho-physiological and
the social dimensions of emergent processes. 
Since Morgan’s emergentism and Mead’s processual ontology were conditioned by the reflections
that the two thinkers had developed over the years and traces back their roots to the early 1890s,
the article will be developed as follows. A brief description of Morgan’s conception of organic and
mental  evolution  as  elaborated  in  the  1890s  and  summarised  in  his  Lowell  Lectures  will  be
outlined. Then Mead’s early writings on psychophysics and comparative psychology, pointing out
a similarity between Mead and Morgan’s ideas on organic and mental evolution at that time will
be introduced. Finally, their theories of emergence from the 1920s, pointing out more interesting
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